Another perspective on consulting allies

Some authors have suggested that granting our allies veto power over American policy decisions could unduly constrain American leadership. See James Carroll, Back to the Future: Redefining the Foreign Investment and National Security Act's Conception of National Security, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167, 197 n. 221 (2009). Such a sweeping claim is both inaccurate and dangerous. In the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, binding consultations over issues related to the American nuclear doctrine have proven essential to maintain the cohesion of the alliance both during and after the Cold War. Secretary of Defense, Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management Report, Phase II: Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission v. (Dec. 2008). However, even in areas outside the scope of traditional NATO responsibilities, the United States should consider genuine consultation prior to definitive adoption of any major foreign policy. Judy Dempsey, EU and NATO vie to set Trans-Atlantic agenda, Int’l Herald Trib., Feb. 19, 2005 at 1 (Secretary General Scheffer and General James Jones believe out-of-area consultations with NATO are critical). Indeed, even if American failure to consult over a major foreign policy decision were unlikely to aggravate relations with NATO allies, such decisions provide a significant opportunity for the United States to create a precedent for future substantive consultations on other important concerns. See David M. Andrews, The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress, 266 (2005) (arguing that genuine outreach toward NATO allies can create a “renewed European invitation” for future engagement).

Far from endangering American leadership, a renewed trend toward consultation with NATO may prove to be the only effective means by which America can maintain its primacy in the 21st century for at least three reasons. First, and most significantly, the very survival of the NATO alliance may depend on American willingness to give its allies a voice in significant political decisions. Philip Gordon, Letter to Europe, Prospect, June 24, 2004. If NATO were to collapse, or substantially weaken, the irreversible decline of United States hegemony would certainly follow. John Hulsman, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Transatlantic Relations and Bush Trip to Europe, Congressional Quarterly (Feb. 16, 2005) (explaining that American power projection depends on support from NATO allies). Second, genuine consultation with NATO helps alleviate international concerns about American unilateralism, which is important in order to quell anti-American sentiments that endanger American soft power. See Joseph Nye, U.S. Power and Strategy after Iraq, 82 Foreign Aff. 60 (2005). As scholars have recognized, soft power is a necessary prerequisite to the effective global exercise of military and political leadership. Id. Third and finally, genuine consultation with NATO can ensure that America’s allies are on board with the major policy decisions of the day. Fred Chernoff, After Bipolarity, 219, 223 (1995) (arguing both that giving NATO allies a genuine voice in decisions can garner support and that American advocacy for a policy in consultations usually causes NATO allies to back the United States). In doing so, the United States can enhance the credibility of its decisions when it acts and help facilitate broader international acceptance of new American goals. Kurt Campbell & Celeste Ward, New Battle Stations?, 61 Foreign Aff. 95 (2003).